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EFFLUENT CHARGES: WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
I. INTRODUCTION
Although there is little argument about the existence of a na-
tional water pollution problem, there are contrasting opinions
about the urgency of that problem and the harmful nature of its
effects. Health officials, for example, have warned that the United
States has become dangerously susceptible to outbreaks of wa-
ter-borne epidemics.' In support of this contention, it was report-
ed in a recent congressional hearing that 228 water-borne disease
outbreaks occurred from 1946 to 1960.2 Similarly, testimony fur-
ther revealed that 50 million Americans were drinking water that
fails to conform with Public Health Service Drinking Water
Standards, and that another 45 million Americans were drinking
water that has not even been tested by the Public Health Service.3
On the other hand, other experts see the principal danger of water
pollution not as a health threat, but as an encroachment on the
beauty of our natural resources. Two leading water resource
economists argue that the great expense of improving water quali-
ty cannot be justified on the basis of insuring public health, and
that current water quality is both adequate and easily maintain-
able for this purpose.4 In support of their contentions, they
allege that water quality improvement or deterioration has no
significant impact upon industrial costs or benefits, and that toxic
elements in municipal water supplies, comprising only a small
amount of drinking water, are separable. 5 Far from negating the
need for water quality improvement, however, these arguments
merely indicate the costs of water quality improvement relative to
the benefits derived therefrom. Thus, whether the problem is
viewed as an eminent health hazard or as a threat to the beauty of
our environment, there is an expressed public demand for quality
water.
Even if no immediate disaster is foreseeable, the evident con-
cern indicates that future water problems and the possibility of
I Hines. Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water QualitY. 52 IOWA L. RE'.
186. 189 (1966).
2 Hearings on Environmental Quality before the House Comm. on Science and Astro-
nautics, 90th Cong., 2nd. Sess.. pt. I, at 179 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 House
Hearings].
3 1968 House Hearings at 180.
4 A. KNEESE & B. BOWER. MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS. TECHNOLOGY.
INSTITUTIONS 125-6 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KNEESE & BOWER].
5 KNEESE & BOWER, 125-126.
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circumventing them should be examined. For example, it has been
predicted that by the year 2000 the amount of fresh water avail-
able in the United States will fall short of demand by 350 billion
gallons per day. 6 Another commentator foresees a decline in the
American standard of living to only a subsistence level in 200
years if present rates of rainfall, population growth, and water use
demand are combined with current treatment and use methods. 7
Assuming that mobilized national concern will prevent such a
drastic reduction in the American standard of living, man must
still contend with the increasing contamination of his environment
by wastes whose effects upon him are as yet undetermined. Testi-
mony presented to a congressional hearing revealed that poten-
tially carcinogenic and toxic substances have been identified in
our water sources, although at levels not currently believed haz-
ardous to health." Whether the presence of such substances at
current levels represents a danger to health is uncertain, because
of insufficient research on long-term implications of the multitu-
dinous known and unknown destroyers of our environment. 9 Nev-
ertheless, it is possible that the limits of human adaptability may
eventually be exceeded by the addition of massive chemical and
mechanical pollution to the environment. Of course, national con-
cern for the environmental problem of water pollution has been
manifested previously, an example being the 1948 Water Pollu-
tion Control Act.' 0 Despite attempts to control water pollution,
however, the problem remains and grows.
Various schemes to abate pollution have been proposed as the
answer to the problem: expansion of existing treatment facilities;
imposition of heavy penalties on individual polluters; granting tax
incentives to reduce pollution; an absolute prohibition on dumping
of certain or all pollutants; and the imposition of effluent"
charges. The particular remedy that is pursued should be selected
on the basis of its ability to eliminate the root causes of pollution.
Therefore, before an effective solution may be formulated, it is
necessary to consider the reasons for the existence of the water
pollution problem.
6 Hines, supra note 1, at 187-188.
7 THE WATER CRISIS, vol. 38, no. 6, p. 23-24 (G. Nokolaieff, ed.).
8 1968 House Hearings 178 (remarks of Dr. Leon Weinberger).
9 Hearings on the Adequacy of Technology for Pollution Abatement before the House
Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 89th Cong., 2nd. Sess., pt. 1, at 458 (1966) (remarks
of Dr. Abel Wolman) [hereinafter cited as 1966 House Hearings].
1033 U.S.C. § 466 (1965).
'1 An effluent is a pollutant that flows out; specifically, the outflow of a sewer or sewage
tank.
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II. CAUSE OF POLLUTION
Water pollution exists because water is an underpriced good. In
other words, the value of water exceeds the price which must be
paid for it. People and industry naturally tend to minimize their
individual costs by using relatively inexpensive goods; hence,
water is consumed in great quantities. Unfortunately, one
by-product of extensive water use is pollution, which damages the
environment and imposes costs in the form of decreased water
quality on subsequent water users. 12 Consequently, a pollution
problem exists because individuals are encouraged to consume
water in a way that damages the environment.
In order to prevent further water pollution, it is necessary to
create a market which will assign to water a price that will serve
as an incentive to users to minimize water consumption. The
effluent charge system is ideally suited to accomplish this task.
This system is a pricing mechanism which would charge each
consumer the total cost 13 of each unit of water purchased, in-
cluding the costs attributable to the pollution his consumption
may create. The charges would provide an incentive for users to
reduce pollution.' 4 The funds which are collected from those who
continue to pollute1 5 would be used to ameliorate water quality. 16
12-These costs include health dangers, foregone aesthetic and recreational benefits,
increased industrial costs, and the burdening of municipal water treatment facilities with
more wastes than the facilities can treat.
13 That total cost is the composite of costs necessary to supply water and to ameliorate
quality, i.e., planning, construction of facilities, operation and maintenance of facilities, and
administration of an effluent charges system.
14 Users can reduce pollution by decreasing water consumption, employing methods of
water use that would minimize pollution, or building their own treatment facilities. Several
industries actually faced with sewer charges for excessive pollution have changed produc-
tion methods in order to minimize sewer charges. KNEESE & BOWER, 168-169.
Contrary to predictions that pollution control will drive some industries out of business,
some industries will actually enjoy net savings and profits by becoming more efficient
water users, i.e., by water recirculation, materials recovery, changing the product mix, or
using cooling tower programs. When a commercial laundry installed a concrete sump
which removed suspended solids from and cooled its discharge water, the result was a net
saving in its production costs, even though the costs included a sewer charge. KNEESE &
BOWER, 169-170.
15 As of now, every polluter is receiving an indirect subsidy through municipally
financed treatment of wastes, through undercharging water users for water services, and
through costly or irremedial damage to the environment. Under an effluent charge system
those water users actually needing a subsidy would have the burden of obtaining a direct
subsidy. It is conceded that industrial polluters who pay effluent charges will probably pass
this cost on to the purchasers of their product. However, it should be recognized that this
is the means by which consumers are allowed to make value judgments regarding particu-
lar water uses. Purchasers of goods will be able to signify their approval or disapproval of
a certain water use by purchasing or not purchasing certain goods, the price of which
reflects the environmental costs of a certain water use. An effluent charges system would
thus create a water price structure which would, by reflecting the relative scarcity of water
for certain uses, allocate water to those uses which would ensure that desired water quality
levels will be achieved.
16 The Department of the Interior conservatively estimated that the capital outlays
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The charges would be calculated so that each consumer would
pay a price reflecting the burden that he imposes upon the assim-
ilative capacities of surface waters. Thus, each polluter would
pay his pro rata share of that expenditure necessary to improve
water quality. Presently, the lawful water quality level in each
state is approved or promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior
under the 1965 Water Quality Act, 17 although some states impose
more stringent standards. Despite the existence of defined water
quality standards and the ability to determine whether water qual-
ity meets those standards, 8 one must still determine the cost of
restoring and maintaining important water quality characteristics.
A recent study indicates that such charges can be calculated by
apportioning the total costs of the water maintenance program to
individual polluters. The 1966 Delaware Estuary Study, in-
dicating that an effluent charge can be calculated in certain cir-
cumstances,' 9 concluded:
required to achieve federally approved water quality standards for the period 1969 through
1973 would be $14.9 billion. This represents three times the total water quality control
expenditure in the United States by all levels of government between 1962 and 1966. If
federal appropriations continue to fund only one half of authorized grants, state and local
governments will be required to spend $12.7 billion from 1969 to 1973, or three times their
expenditures from 1962 to 1966. If federal appropriations were to equal authorizations for
water pollution control, state and local governments would have to provide approximately
$11 billion. FED. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., DEPT. OF INTERIOR, THE COST
OF CLEAN WATER 9-10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as THE COST OF CLEAN WATER]. A
greater amount of money than previously made available must be provided in order that
progress may be made in meeting desired water quality standards.
1733 U.S.C. 466g (c) (1965). As of 1969, 49 states, three territories and the District of
Columbia standards had been approved. Hearings on Water Pollution before the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1030 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
1969 Senate Hearings].
18 It is currently known how to measure important water quality characteristics in-
stantaneously or over time periods of one month by continuous monitoring. In 1968 the
United States Geological Survey was engaged in continuous and periodic monitoring of
8,000 surface water sites, and was completing plans for collecting all information in a
master data bank. 1968 House Hearings 200 (remarks of W. T. Pecora, Director of U.S.
Geological Survey, Department of the Interior). In 1967, the Ohio River Valley interstate
compact agency, ORSANCO, reported that it was able to survey by robot monitoring ten
different water quality characteristics from as many as 40 different locations. The monitor-
ing system assembled data on quantity and quality variations. ORSANCO also reported
success with tracing spills and accidential discharges. E. CLEARY, THE ORSANCO STORY
197.210(1967).
19 The study calculated the magnitude of charges necessary to reach a specified water
quality in a specific body, the Delaware Estuary. Sophisticated monitoring and computer
simulation of individual polluters' dumping behavior were used to estimate the costs of
waste removal financed by effluent charges. Four cost allocation methods were used to
calculate the charges necessary to achieve five alternate levels of dissolved oxygen in the
estuary. The study assumed that an individual polluter would not reduce its waste gener-
ation and that the quality to be ameliorated was one of a low oxygen level, thereby
maximizing cost estimates. Johnson, A Study in the Economics of Water Quality Manage-
ment, 3 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH JOURNAL 291-5(1967).
It is unlikely that a perfectly accurate effluent charge could presently be calculated. A
strict cost-benefit analysis would make effluent charges impossible of accuracy, because
we cannot presently measure aesthetic and recreational value components of water quality.
KNEESE & BOWER, 127. If the benefits of high water quality cannot be so measured, then
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[E]xcept in isolated cases, occurring at unrealistic levels of
charges, per capita cost of indirect treatment plus charge
payments do not appear to be unreasonably high. 20
The Estuary Study further concluded that a scheme of charges
could achieve desired water quality at lower treatment costs than
conventional waste treatment. 21
III. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Any level of government-federal, state, or local-could ad-
minister a system of effluent charges. There are, however, prob-
lems peculiar to each of these levels which must be considered if
the effectiveness of such a system is to be maximized. For ex-
ample, if an effluent charge system is instituted at the local level,
limits which our laws place on municipal jurisdictional power may
diminish the impact of the program.
The history of water pollution control efforts in St. Joseph,
Missouri, illustrates this problem. Because of that municipality's
lack of jurisdiction over upstream polluters, meat packers outside
the city limits dumped their wastes into the Missouri River with
impunity. Neither state nor federal enforcement officials were able
to expedite control procedures. Consequently, four years elapsed
between the first enforcement attempt and the eventual resolution
of the dispute by the passage of a bond issue to finance construc-
tion of necessary treatment facilities. 22
A second problem in administering an effluent charge program
on a local level is that responsibility remains so fractionated that it
is extremely difficult to realize either comprehensive planning or
the damage to those benefits caused by pollution likewise cannot be given a dollar value.
Consequently, it is presently impossible to assign a dollar price to water which reflects all
the costs of water use; however, the problem of realizing a theoretically ideal pricing
mechanism has been mooted by the 1965 Water Quality Act. See note 17, supra. By this
legislation, Congress has ordered the states to establish water quality standards which are
acceptable to the Department of the Interior. It will require the expenditure of an
ascertainable sum of money to meet such standards, and that cost will determine the price
of water to be assigned to each consumer.
As the analysis of real costs and benefits to various users for different water uses
becomes more refined, data derived therefrom could be used to set charges in a com-
prehensive water development program which would not only comply with federally
approved water quality standards, but would also respond more accurately to the public
demand for water quality. For the near future, however, federally approved standards must
be met and costs must be assessed accordingly. Although federally approved standards
may not accurately identify the real costs of water pollution, this imperfect method of
estimating true collective public costs created by water pollution is the best presently
available.2 0 Johnson, supra note 19, at 303. For individuals, the estimated cost ranged from $0.49
to $7.72 per person per year to attain a reasonable water quality level; for industry, costs
ranged from 1.2% of output value to a maximum of 5% of value for paperboard mills.
21 Johnson, supra note 19, at 306.
22 LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, THE BIG WATER FIGHT 41, 43 (1966).
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effective pollution abatement. For example, it would be inefficient
and ineffective to construct and operate municipal waste treat-
ment facilities when a significant source of pollution is jurisdic-
tionally immune from the municipality's power to charge for use
of treatment facilities. It would also be inefficient to ignore pos-
sible scale economies for pollution control accruing from a com-
prehensive water resource unit.
An effluent charge system instituted at the federal level would
also encounter serious problems. First, the history of congression-
al appropriations does not support an expectation that the federal
government will finance a substantial part of water pollution con-
trol costs. 23 It has been estimated that for the years 1969 through
1973 it will cost $15 billion to achieve federally approved water
quality standards; 24 an estimated additional $110 billion will be
required over the next thirty years to maintain acceptable water
quality.2 5 From the beginning of the construction grants program
in 1956 through 1968, total federal grants were only $960 mil-
lion.26 Total project costs in the United States for that same
period, however, were $4,598 million. 27 If federal appropriations
continue in the same manner, state and local governments will be
required to provide $12.7 billion of the estimated $15 billion
necessary for the years 1969 through 1973.
Perhaps an even greater obstacle to implementation of an
effluent charge program at the federal level is political accept-
ability. A majority of the 47 state governors polled in a 1966
House of Representatives study disapproved of federally imposed
effluent charges, but several suggested that state imposed charges
might be appropriate. 28 It was pointed out that despite the success
of the Tennessee Valley Authority in revitalizing an economically
depressed region, this autonomous, managerially independent,
federal regional authority has received little acceptance outside
" The states have already been carrying the greatest financial burden in water pollution
control. Note 16, supra. See also 33 U.S.C. 466 (b):
[i]t is declared to be the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the states in preventing and
controlling water pollution ... and to provide ... financial aid to states and
interstate agencies and to municipalities in connection with the prevention
and control of water pollution.
24 THE COST OF CLEAN WATER, supra note 16, at 9.
2 Carmichael, Forty Years of Water Pollution Control in Wisconsin, 1967 Wis. L. REV.
350, 415 (citing, Hanks and Kube, Industry Action to Combat Pollution, 44 HARV. Bus.
REV. 49, 57-9 (1966).
26 1969 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at A 70.
27 1969 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at A 70.
2 8 Hearings on Activities of the House Comm. on Government Operations before the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., Ist & 2nd Sess. 48 (1966). Works
are "financed by a system of charges designed to cover, to the extent practicable, construc-
tion costs of such works and operating and maintenance costs."
[VOL. 4:1
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the Valley. Similarly, federal administrators have repeatedly re-
jected the idea of more agencies of this nature when proposals for
TVA-type solutions to national problems have been advanced. 29
Moreover, experiences of the Arkansas-White-Red River Basins
Inter-Agency Committee and the Texas Commission indicate that
comprehensive federal water management programs, administered
through the joint efforts of relevant federal agencies, would foster
undesirable inter-agency competition.3" Nor will implementation
of an effluent charge system at the state level completely avoid
administrative problems. For example, many jurisdictional prob-
lems encountered with a municipally controlled program will also
be present under state administration. Furthermore, economies of
scale possible through massive water treatment programs may not
be realized to the extent that inter-state cooperation will be re-
quired. Finally, many people believe that the states are less sensi-
tive to public needs than other levels of government, however,
these charges may be unfounded. 31
Notwithstanding these potential obstacles, the problems of ad-
ministering an effluent charge system at either the federal3 2 or
municipal 3 level are such that at the present time such a system
is best administered by the state. Therefore, the remainder of this
comment will discuss the constitutional problems of implementa-
tion of state programs designed to solve the problem of water
pollution.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATE ACTIONS
NECESSARY FOR WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
A successfully administered state program of water pollution
control based on effluent charges will require the state to con-
struct, operate, and maintain all treatment and water resource
29 P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
FORMAL ORGANIZATION 78, 262 (1966). The very same factors so crucial to TVA's
success have probably created opposition to similar experiments with independent federal
regional agencies: freedom from Civil Service requirements, freedom to apply revenues to
current operating expenses without accountability to Congress, and power to make region-
al planning decisions and to carry them out by coordinating state, local and other federal
agencies.
30 R. PEALY, COMPREHENSIVE RIVER BASIN PLANNING: THE ARKANSAS-WHITE-RED
RIVER BASINS INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE EXPERIENCE 53 (U. of Mich., Institute of Public
Hlealth 1959); and R. PEALY, ORGANIZATION FOR COMPREHENSIVE RIVER BASIN PLAN-
NING: THE TEXAS AND SOUTHEAST EXPERIENCE 152, 159 (U. of Mich., Institute of
Public Health 1959).
31 See, 1966 House Hearings 487. Dr. Abel Wolman remarked:
[Clontrary to undocumented pronouncements of those who have recently
'discovered' the pollution problem, the record of many state agencies has
been outstanding in dealing with it .... long before pollution was a
high-pitched political issue ... substantial progress was made by the states.
32 See notes 23-30, supra.
33 See note 22, supra.
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facilities and to calculate and impose charges over the whole
state. Water treatment traditionally has been performed by politi-
cal subdivisions (hereinafter "municipalities") of the states. Con-
sequently, to exercise the required control, it would be necessary
for the state to appropriate municipally owned and operated facil-
ities either by eminent domain or by legislation transferring con-
trol of such facilities to state agencies.
The United States Supreme Court held in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh34 that a state's power to exercise eminent domain over,
or transfer control of municipal property to state agencies is
unlimited by the Federal Constitution but subject to any state
constitutional provisions. Indeed, Hunter has provided the basis
for the doctrine that, except where limitations have been imposed
by the state constitution, the powers of a legislature with respect
to its municipalities are unlimited. 35 The philosophy underlying
this doctrine of legislative supremacy is that:
In the absence of state constitutional provisions safeguard-
ing it to them, municipalities have no inherent right of
self-government which is beyond the legislative control of the
State. A municipality is merely a department of the State, and
the State may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privi-
leges as it sees fit. However great or small its sphere of
action, it remains the creature of the State exercising and
holding powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will.3 6
34207 u.s. 161 (1907). The Court held at 175-179 that the Pennsylvania legislature
could permit consolidation of the governments and property of the cities of Allegheny and
Pittsburgh. The rationale of the decision was:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers
properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to acquire, hold, and
manage personal and real property. The number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they
shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. Neither their
charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, or vesting in them
property to be used for governmental pruposes, or authorizing them to hold
or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, con-
stitutes a contract with the state within the meaning of the Federal Con-
stitution. The state, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all
such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself or
vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the
whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy
the corporation. All this may be done conditionally or unconditionally, with
or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all
these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its
action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any
provision of the Constitution of the United States. (Emphasis added).
35 See note 34, supra. See also Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379
F.2d 321 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967). Detroit Edison Co. v. East China
Twp. School District No. 3, 378 F.2d 225 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967).36 City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923). Here, the state
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In addition, a state has, as an adjunct of its police power, the
''power ... and duty to control and conserve the use of its water
resources for the benefit of all its inhabitants, "3 7 and the power to
prohibit discharges causing or tending to cause pollution.38
Despite the powers of the states over their municipalities and
over the use of the water resources of the state, an exercise of
these powers in a state-administered program of effluent charges
may in some cases encounter state constitutional barriers. Three
types of state constitutional provisions relevant to legislative con-
trol of municipal sewage facilities are: (1) provisions which prohi-
bit "special commissions; "3 9 (2) provisions providing for munici-
pal home rule; 40 and (3) provisions placing limitations upon in-
debtedness.
A. The Prohibition Against Special Commissions
There are only four reported decisions dealing with the issue of
whether state administrative control over municipal sewage or
public utility facilities constitutes a violation of a state con-
stitutional prohibition of special commissions. Two of those deci-
sions are from the Supreme Court of Utah. In Logan City v.
was allowed to recover damages in an action to recover license fees from the City of
Trenton for water diverted from the Delaware River. Some courts, prompted by Hunter,
have limited the state's power over municipal property to that held by the municipality in a
governmental, as opposed to a proprietary, capacity.
Handloff, Legislative Limitations Upon the Self-Government of Municlipalities, 31
Temp. L.Q. 243 (1958). See also Monaghan v. Armatage, 218 Minn. 108, 15 N.W.2d 241
(1944), holding that property held by a municipality in either a governmental or proprietary
function is subject to the paramount power of the state. For an understanding of the
distinction between governmental and proprietary capacities, see Hunter, supra note 34.
37262 U.S. 182, 185.
38 United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1966); Texas Co. v.
Montgomery, 73 F.Supp. 527 (E.D. La.), affdmem. 332 U.S. 827 (1947).39See for example UTAH CONST. art VI, § 29:
The legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corpo-
ration or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capital site, or to perform any municipal
functions.
The OHIO CONST. art 18, § 4, which gives municipalities power to acquire, construct,
own, lease or operate public utilities whose product or service is to be supplied to the
municipality or its inhabitants, has been construed by the Ohio Supreme Court to prevent
the legislature from imposing any restrictions on this right. Pfau v. City of Cincinnati, 142
Ohio St. 101, 50 N.E.2d 172, 173 (1943). In these states, to overcome judicial construc-
tion of sewage as a constitutionally protected municipal function, it would be necessary to
either amend the state constitution so that the state would have ultimate authority in the
area of sewage, or else hope for a change in interpretation of the provisions permitting
municipal activity in the public area.
40 In 1966, there were 33 states with constitutional home rule; there were 10 with
legislative home rule. See Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10
WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 273-7 (1968). In legislative home rule states, the state
constitution would not prevent the exercise of state power over municipal property,
according to the Hunter case.
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Public Utilities Commission of Utah4' a Public Utilities Act
delegated to a state administrative commission the power to fix
rates of electric utilities, including municipally owned public utili-
ties. The court held that the Act was in violation of the state
constitution, because it delegated to a special commission the
power to "indirectly supervise, direct and interfere with" a munic-
ipal improvement.42 However, the court emphasized that the
municipal utility involved was owned and operated by the city
solely for the use and benefit of the city's inhabitants. 43 The court
noted that if the utility were to affect persons unable to exercise
control over its operations, a state commission to control such a
utility would be a legitimate exercise of the state police power.44
In view of the court's distinction between a utility affecting only
city inhabitants, and a utility affecting persons outside the city, the
Logan decision seems reconcilable with the concept of state con-
trol of utilities whose effects go beyond the city's boundaries.
In a subsequent case, State Water Pollution Control Board v.
Salt Lake City,45 the Utah Supreme Court followed'its earlier
literal application of the state constitutional ban against special
commissions. In Pollution Control Board the court held that the
Board's regulations concerning the design of municipal sewer
systems were invalid because they interfered with municipal im-
provements. The court, however, placed a qualification on munic-
ipal control by indicating that the municipal sewer system would
come under the jursidiction of the Board if the system were
conducted so that it posed a pollution threat beyond the confines
of the city. Since the Pollution Control Board court carefully
limited its holding to "the problem of sewage disposal within Salt
Lake City" 46 [emphasis added], the decision is not inconsistent
with the Logan court's conclusion that state control is unwar-
ranted where the municipality's operation of the utility affects
only those persons within the city.
Similarly, Pennsylvania followed Utah in declaring that munici-
pal sewage facilities are municipal improvements which may not
be regulated by a special commission. 47 The Pennsylvania court
4172 Utah 536, 271 P. 961 (1928).
42 271 P. at 972.
43271 P. at 971.
44271 P. at 971.
6 Utah 2d 247, 311 P.2d 370 (1957).
46 311 P.2d 375. The court observed that
[i]t is obvious that a community might so handle its sewage as to constitute a
menance to the health of other communities or inhabitants of the
state.... [In such cases] the Board is endowed with authority to supervise
and regulate such matters where they are conducted in a manner which
threatens pollution of waters beyond the confines of the city.
47 Lighton v. Abington Township, 336 Pa. 345, 9A.2d 609 (1939).
[VOL. 4:1
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held that the legislature could not authorize a municipality to
delegate the management of a municipal sewage system to a
private corporation, because the legislature itself was powerless
under the Pennsylvania Constitution to effect such a delegation.
However, the court noted that the Constitution proscribed only
delegation to a private corporation, and acknowledged the state's
power to "modify township government by taking part of it from
the township, and vesting it in a public corporation." 48 Since the
court expressly stated that its decision concerned an uncon-
stitutional authorization to a municipality "to make a contract
with a private corporation to take over and operate public proper-
ty" 49 [emphasis added], the case is distinguishable from state
control and operation of municipal utilities by public bodies.
The Montana courts have also determined that regulation and
control of water rentals by a state Public Service Commission
does not offend the state constitutional prohibition against delega-
tion of powers to a special commission.50 In ruling on a challenge
to a Montana statute which literally divested municipalities of all
control over their sewage facilities and made state control su-
preme, 51 the Montana Supreme Court strained to construe the
statutory language as intending to authorize "reasonable regu-
lation" and not to "take away from the city active management of
the water plant or to operate it or interfere with" its operation.52
The court clearly was concerned with the public policy issue of a
state's power to control pollution. It rejected the city's claim of
absolute control over its water system on grounds that
if it should transpire that the water supply became con-
taminated, spreading contagious disease generally, the state
would be helpless and could not interfere. We decline to
adopt such a construction, since, as we view it, the language
of the constitutional provision does not lead to that con-
clusion.53
Thus the Montana interpretation indicates there is room for at
least "reasonable" state regulation of municipal sewage facilities,
4 8 9A.2d 613.
4 9 9A.2d 613.
50 Public Service Commission of Montana v. City of Helena. 52 Mont. 527, 159 P. 24
(1916).
51 The Montana Supreme Court interpreted the statute which provided:
... the Public Service Commission is hereby invested with full power of
supervision, regulation and control of such utilities... and to the exclusion
of the jursidiction. regulation and control of such utilities, by any municipal-
ity, town or village.
159 P. 28.
52 159 P. 28.
53 159 P. 28.
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and the Pollution Control Board case would presumably allow
state control when water pollution has undesirable effects beyond
the borders of a municipality. It is therefore possible, in states
having constitutional provisions similar to those of Utah and
Montana, that the courts may entertain the argument that water
pollution is a state concern since the damage caused by in-
adequate municipal sewage treatment and pollution control has
statewide effects. An additional reason may be that the state may
be sued for failing to curb pollution within its borders. 54 In view
of the duty of the states to control pollution, the generally recog-
nized validity of the exercise of the state police power to protect
municipal water supplies, 55 and the fact that water pollution is a
condition whose effects extend beyond the boundaries of any
particular municipality, it would seem that the states have an
interest in the coordinated administration of all sewage facilities
sufficient to justify state administrative control.
B. Municipal Home Rule
A second potential constitutional stumbling block to state con-
trol of municipal sewage facilities is the problem of whether a
home rule provision in a state constitution 56 permits only local
control of sewage treatment facilities. The language of con-
stitutional home rule provisions generally provide, for legislative
supremacy;5 7 however, most states have found an area of munici-
pal freedom from legislative control implicit in the home rule
provisions.
This division of ultimate power over municipalities is character-
ized in language of "state" versus "local" affairs; however, the
courts have consistently failed to develop a rule for identifying a
state or local affair.58 In any event, the reason frequently given for
this municipal autonomy is that unless local law prevails over
inconsistent state law, the home rule provision would have no
54 33 U.S.C. § 466g (g) (j) (i) and (k) (1965) gives the federal governmental the power to
sue a state or its political subdivisions for violation of the 1948 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.
5- See for example Public Service Commission of Montana v. City of Helena, 52 Mont.
527, 159 P. 24 (1916).
56 See for example Mo. CONST. art. 6. § 18 (a), which provides:
Any country having more than 85,000 inhabitants, according to the census
of the United States, may frame and adopt and amend a charter for its own
government as provided in this article, and upon such adoption shall be a
body corporate and politic.57See for example Mo. CONST. art. 6, § 19, which provides that home rule charters are
to be "consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of the State."
18 Dyson, Ridding Home Rule of the Local Affairs Problem, 12 U. of Kan. L. Rev. 367,
368 (1964).
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purpose. 59 In most states today, however, affairs of a municipality
are subject to regulation if they are also concerns of the state.60
As discussed with reference to state prohibitions of special com-
missions, water pollution control is not just a legitimate area of
state concern, but an area in need of immediate state action.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether municipalities would have
either the jurisdictional ability to deal adequately with water pol-
lution or the inclination to fund the necessary program once the
pollution was within the municipality's control. Thus, the legisla-
tive action necessary to administer an effluent charge system at
the state level should not be voided by state home rule provi-
sions.6 1
C. State Constitutional Limitation Upon Indebtedness
To raise the funds necessary for adequate water quality control,
states may be required to issue bonds beyond present state con-
stitutional limits on indebtedness. 6 2 These limits, however, apply
59 See State ex rel. Avery v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 586-7, 53 N.E.2d 501, 508
(1944).
60 Vanlandingham, supra note 40, at 293. See also Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167
N.E. 705, 713 (1929). Here, an inconsistent state law prevailed because it was a general
health law which applied to a substantial state concern.
Extraterritorial pollution effects provided the rationale for a New York court's decision
that an act creating the Buffalo Sewer Authority was constitutional and not void as a "local
law." In Robertson v. Zimmerman, 268 N.Y. 52, 59, 268 N.E. 740, 742 (1935), the court
said that:
[The act] was designed to eliminate a serious menace to the health of the
people of the state generally, and particularly the communities ... which are
obtaining their water supply from the waters polluted by untreated sewage
from the city of Buffalo.
The issue was whether a law applying to only one home rule municipality was a "local" or
"general" law. The issue required the labelling of a municipal activity or municipally
owned property as either a "general" or a "local" concern. The New York Constitution
home rule charter provision said that the Legislature would prevail over its municipalities
only by general laws, not by local or special laws. See also Opinion of the Justices, 250
N.E.2d 547 (1969).
61 California represents one of a small number of states whose constitutional home rule
provisions clearly prohibit legislative interference in the affairs of local government. CAL.
CONST. art. 11, § 6, provides that charter cities and towns might "make and enforce all
laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and
limitations provided in their several charters .... The California courts have upheld this
municipal dominance in local affairs; specifically with regard to sewage facilities. In
Cramer v. City of San Diego, 164 Cal. App.2d 168, 330 P.2d 235 (1958) the court held
that the operation and financing of a sewer system are municipal affairs concerning which a
chartered city is not subject to general law, except as its charter may provide. This case is
significant, because the California court construed a constitutionally authorized grant of
power to a municipality in regard to a certain activity as an absolute grant. In states like
California, a state constitutional amendment authorizing state control over sewage facil-
ities would be required in order to administer a valid state system of effluent charges.
62 See for example KAN. CoNsT. art. II, § 6, which provides in part:
For the purpose of defraying extraordinary expenses and making public
improvements, the state may contract public debts; but such debts shall
never, in the aggregate, exceed one million dollars....
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to general obligation bonds, 63 and not to revenue bonds, for a
pledge of the revenue from a public utility or other property
purchased with bond issue proceeds does not create an in-
debtedness within the meaning of constitutional or statutory debt
limitations.6 4 The theory underlying the doctrine that revenue
bonds are not indebtedness within the meaning of constitutional
prohibitions is that the creditor has no legal right to call upon or
constrain the debtor-state to pay.
In the proposed scheme, the level of effluent charges would be
set so that the revenue received over time would be sufficient to
redeem the principal and interest on any state bond issues neces-
sary to finance not only the initial planning and construction costs
but maintenance, expansion and administrative costs as well. One
problem, however, is that 100% financing of the program by
revenue bonds could so tremendously increase state bond
offerings that the supply (given possible state restrictions on the
interest rate which may be paid) might be greater than the de-
mand. Nevertheless, these considerations would not invalidate the
practicability of financing as much of the costs of starting and
administering an effluent charges system as possible and supple-
menting the necessary financial support with continued state and
federal appropriations for water pollution control. In any event,
the use of revenue bonds would escape state constitutional debt
and referendum limitations on an effluent charge system and could
be used to finance as much of the costs of pollution control as
possible without resorting to general tax measures and legislative
appropriations for the total amount of necessary funds.
V. CONCLUSION
A state implemented system of effluent charges supplemented
by existing state and federal water quality control laws would
serve as a pricing mechanism by which water would be allocated
to the uses and users found by the general public to be most
deserving. When production of a certain commodity has resulted
- General obligation bonds are those paid out of general revenues of the governmental
unit issuing the bonds and guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the governmental unit.
64 See for example in State ex rel. Fatzer v. Board of Regents of State of Kansas, 167
Kan. 587, 207 P.2d 373 (1949), where the Supreme Court of Kansas held that revenue
bonds which were issued by the State to obtain funds for construction of student dormi-
tories and which required the bondholders to look solely to revenue and income from
dormitories for repayment did not constitute a debt within the meaning of the state
constitution, and were not required to be submitted for the approval of the voters. On the
subject of referendum requirements and revenue bonds, see generally Foley, Revenue
Financing of Public Enterprises, 35 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1936).
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in the discharge of pollutants into a river or stream covered by the
plan, the manufacturer will incur a charge which will be reflected
in the cost of the product to the public. Thus, by comparing the
prices of similar products, the public can choose the manufacturer
who is most efficient and pollutes the least. In addition to properly
allocating the scarce resource of quality water, a comprehensive
system of effluent charges can provide the funds necessary to
maintain water quality at desired levels.
To successfully institute a proposal of this type, the individual
states should adopt legislation which would accomplish the fol-
lowing:
l.Vest ownership in and/or transfer control to the state of all
publicly owned water resource facilities in the state;
2. Establish a state agency, with the authority and responsibility
for statewide comprehensive water resources planning, de-
velopment, and management, whose power and duties would
include:
a. the power to issue revenue bonds,
b. the power to monitor water resources and sewage flows of
any water user in the state,
c. the responsibility and authority to identify particular sub-
stances as pollutants, 65
d. the power to prohibit any dumping into state waters of
6 It is conceivable that some persons would challenge such legislation on the grounds
that it constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive
because of the lack of a sufficient standard to guide agency discretion. However, such
sufficient standards could probably be provided to define the limits of agency discretion in
identifying pollutants by re-enacting federal water quality standards established for that
state as state law, by specifically referring to state water quality standards, and by declaring
substances found to violate or which tend to violate such standards to be pollutants. A
much broader delegation of discretion than proposed here was upheld in Texas Co. v.
Montgomery, 73 F.Supp. 527 (E.D.La.), affid, 332 U.S. 827 (1947). There, a delegation of
power to prohibit discharges resulting in pollution, which is unreasonable and against the
public interest in view of existing water conditions, was upheld. An almost equally broad
delegation was upheld in an air pollution case, Department of Health v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp., 100 N.J.Sup. 366, 242 A.2d 21 (1968), where the standard for "air
pollution" defined by the legislature was that of proof of injury to health or unreasonable
interference with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property. Finally, the cases dealing
with the delegation of discretion to agencies to designate particular substances as narcot-
ics, depressants, or stimulating drugs for purposes of criminal prosecutions are important.
Broad delegations which have been upheld are: found to be addicting, Martinez v. Colora-
do, 160 Colo. 333, 417 P.2d 485 (1966). Hohnke v. Commonwealth. 451 S.W.2d 162
(1970): found to have potential for abuse, White v. United States, 395 F.2d 5 (Ist Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 928, and Iske v. United States, 396 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1968).
The criminal drug cases are important, because the standard for an ascertainable guide to
agency discretion must be more clearly defined when criminal, rather than non-criminal,
consequences are involved. State v. Phelps, 12 Ariz. App. 83, 467 P.2d 923 (1970). Both
the drug designation powers and the pollutant designation powers are granted to protect
the public health and welfare from insidious influences. In the water pollution case, where
the designation will lead to a monetary payment as a consequence of the exercise of
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pollutants, which are either prohibitively expensive, dan-
gerous, or impossible to treat or remove from the water, 66
e. the authority and responsibility to calculate and collect
effluent charges from all water users within the state; 67 and
3. Allow actions by private attorneys general against the agency
as a means of ensuring that the public interest in quality
water is protected from agency inaction or error.
-Giovanna M. Longo
agency discretion, the proposed standards are no less stringent than those already sus-
tained in the criminal drug cases, and such proposed water pollution standards should be
more than sufficient.
66 Delegations of the state's power to prohibit pollution have been upheld in Department
of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., supra note 65 (air pollution discharges), and
in Texas v. Montgomery, supra note 65 (water pollution discharges).
67 The argument that effluent charges would be a direct tax, subject to state con-
stitutional infirmities such as uniformity requirements or prohibitions against delegation of
the taxing power, are most probably invalid. An effluent charge would, like a toll for a
bridge, be a charge for the use of another's property. In the case of effluent charges, the
charge would be for the use of the state's water resource and treatment facilities.
Whenever the issue has been raised, it has been held that statutes relating to tolls for the
use of bridges or similar improvements do not come within state constitutional provisions
respecting taxes. See People ex rel Curren v. Schommer, 392 Ill. 17, 63 N.E.2d 744
(1945), where the court held that tolls charged by the state Highway Commission for the
use of its superhighway were compensation for the use of another's property and not a tax;
Tulare County v. Dinube, 188 Cal. 664, 206 P. 983 (1922), where the court held that a
statutory annual charge of 2% of gross receipts against public service corporations with a
state franchise was a toll paid as consideration for the privilege of using highways occupied
by public utilities and not a tax; State ex rel Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle,
195 Wash. 636, 82 P.2d 120 (1938), where in an action to compel the state auditor to
approve certain vouchers the court held that tolls collected by the state Toll Bridge
Authority were an exaction for the use of the bridge and not a tax, and, therefore, not to be
treated as tax revenues.
The United States Supreme Court articulated the rationale of the distinction between a
toll and a tax in Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Company, 123 U.S. 288 (1887),
which rationale has been either expressly cited or borrowed by state courts. In Sands, the
Court upheld a board of control's authority to fix rates of toll for floating logs and lumber
over improved portions of a river:
Taxes are levied for the support of the government, and their amount is
regulated by its necessities. Toll are the compensation for the use of an-
ther's property, or of improvements made by him; and their amount is
determined by the cost of the property, or of the improvements, and consid-
erations of the return which such values or expenditures should yield. The
legislature ... may prescribe ... the tolls to be charged; but, ordinarily, it
leaves their amount to be fixed by officers or bodies appointed for that
purpose ....
